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THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN THE GLOBAL 
WAR ON TERRORISM 
Michael B. Mukasey*
Abstract: The following article is edited remarks from Attorney General 
Mukasey’s Commencement address at Boston College Law School on 
May 23, 2008. His remarks focus on the role and ethics of lawyers in the 
Global War on Terrorism. Attorney General Mukasey contends that law-
yers must faithfully adhere to the law, especially in the national security 
context where the questions are complex, the stakes are high and the 
pressures to do something other than adhere to the law are great. At-
torney General Mukasey argues that political and public pressure on na-
tional security lawyers can lead to “cycles of timidity and aggression,” 
and that scrutiny of their work, given the threats facing the country fol-
lowing September 11, 2001, must be conducted responsibly, with an ap-
preciation of its institutional implications. 
 Boston College Law School has a history of inviting commence-
ment speakers who reflect diverse views on important legal and public 
policy issues. Of course, this has meant speakers with whom some fac-
ulty members and students have strongly disagreed—including, most 
recently, me. That history is consistent with what elevates American 
legal education above mere indoctrination and makes it worthy of be-
ing called higher education; that history includes a hearty welcome to 
open discourse on vital questions of the day. 
 Many of those questions in today’s world revolve around the ter-
rorist threat to the civilization we all treasure. It should be no surprise 
that questions about how we should confront that threat have gener-
ated vigorous debate at this law school, and at others around the 
country. Those questions are among the most complex and conse-
quential that a democratic government can face. How we as a nation 
should seek to protect ourselves; whether the steps we take are pro-
portional to the threat and consistent with our history and principles; 
where the legal lines are in this new and very different conflict; and, 
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as a matter of policy, how close to those legal lines we should go, and 
whether the lines themselves should be redrawn—these are questions 
that, understandably, trigger passionate debate. 
 Whether or not you pursue national security law as a vocation, 
and whether or not you go into other kinds of public service, all of 
you, as lawyers, will have a special role in that debate—as you will in 
many others. This is not only because, as Alexis de Tocqueville fa-
mously observed, political questions in the United States often turn 
into legal questions,1 but also because, as lawyers, you have developed 
a set of tools that enable you—and assumed a set of commitments that 
require you—to conduct dispassionate and reasoned analysis, to distin-
guish what is legally relevant from what is not and, most important, to 
distinguish legal questions from political questions. 
 Answering legal questions often involves a close reading and a 
critical analysis of text—the Constitution, statutes, judicial decisions 
and the like. Regrettably, that elementary point—elementary at least 
to those of you in this graduating class—is far too often lost in public 
discourse. Newspapers and commentators, for example, often discuss 
legal questions with barely any acknowledgement of the fact that the 
answers may depend on the language of, say, the Constitution or a 
statute. And critics of a policy decision far too rarely draw the distinc-
tion between whether that course of action is prudent as a matter of 
policy and whether it is permitted as a matter of law. 
 That is a critical distinction; indeed, it is a distinction that goes to 
the heart of what it means to live in a society governed by the rule of 
law. I don’t mean to suggest that lawyers can or should approach legal 
questions with no regard for their own values or moral commitments. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that a lawyer should express no opinion 
about matters of policy—although policy opinion should be ex-
pressed without disguising it in the language of the law. 
 A lawyer’s principal duty is to advise his client as to the best read-
ing of the law—to define the space in which the client may legally act. 
If you do your job well, there will be times when you will advise clients 
that the law prohibits them from taking their desired course of action, 
or even prohibits them from doing things that are, in your view, the 
right thing to do. And there will be times when you will have to advise 
clients that the law permits them to take actions that you may find 
imprudent, or even wrong. 
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2009] The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism 181 
 This nation’s well-proved commitment to the rule of law is what 
sets it apart from many other countries around the world and 
throughout history. If that commitment is to persist—if we are to re-
main, as we often say, “a nation of laws, not of men”2—then we must 
insist that law matters, that the law is something other than a hollow 
vessel into which a client, or a policymaker, may pour his or her per-
sonal views or preferences. And whether you go into public service (as 
I hope many of you will) or into the private sector (as I did initially 
and have more than once since); whether you pursue the public in-
terest in some other way or enter the legal academy, you, as lawyers, 
must do law. 
 You must do law even—you must do law especially—when the 
stakes are high and the pressures to do something else are tremen-
dous. Nowhere are the stakes higher and the pressures greater than 
when the subject is national security, where, as I said earlier, the ques-
tions are as complex and as consequential as they come. 
 The questions are complex because, in this area, the limits of ex-
ecutive power are not clearly defined by the Constitution or by well-
settled precedent; because the laws Congress has enacted often speak 
in general terms and do not provide clear answers to the novel ques-
tions we confront; and because there are few judicial markers to guide 
the conscientious lawyer. 
 The questions are consequential because the stakes are anything 
but academic. Lives, economic prosperity—our way of life—may hang 
in the balance. 
 As if that weren’t enough, every national security lawyer knows 
that decisions made in the heat of crisis may be second-guessed under 
radically different conditions: in the comparative calm of a hearing 
room or an editorial board room, with the well-known but rarely ac-
knowledged benefit of perfect hindsight. 
 Consider the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001. I 
was a federal judge in New York City that day; my courtroom was not 
far from Ground Zero. I can personally attest to the bravery and hard 
work of many people—government employees and civilians alike—in 
response to the attacks; but I cannot describe from any personal ex-
perience what that day, and the days that followed, were like inside 
the executive branch, for those with the duty and the responsibility of 
protecting the country. 
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 But I do recall the very public scrutiny that followed in the 
months after the attacks. The 9/11 Commission and congressional 
committees, among other bodies, conducted thorough investigations 
into whether the attacks could have been prevented, and how our 
government could be better equipped to prevent future terrorist 
strikes. 
 The narratives produced by these investigations were, in many 
instances, stories of missed opportunities. The subtext of these narra-
tives—in fact, at times, the text—was that risk-aversion can have grave 
costs. The 9/11 Commission report, for example, tells of operations 
against Osama bin Laden that were contemplated but not executed; 
of surveillance considered but not requested; of information not 
shared; of so-called “dots” not connected.3
 Understandably, and reasonably, government lawyers were not 
immune from that public scrutiny. For example, lawyers in the Justice 
Department and in our intelligence agencies were criticized for inter-
preting the law as establishing a “wall” between intelligence collection 
and law enforcement4—an interpretation that the federal appeals 
court responsible for reviewing foreign intelligence surveillance 
would later conclude was wrong.5 Others asserted that this interpreta-
tion was too cautious, and impeded information-sharing about 
threats.6
 Complaints about risk-averse national security lawyers were com-
monplace in the first few years following the September 11 attacks. 
About a year after the attacks, one prominent senator said: 
[W]e are not living in times in which lawyers can say no to an 
operation just to play it safe. We need excellent, aggressive 
lawyers who give sound, accurate legal advice, not lawyers 
who say no to an otherwise legal operation just because it is 
easier to put on the brakes.7
 A few years later, another blue-ribbon commission made a similar 
observation, noting that many people in our intelligence agencies 
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claimed that their efforts to protect our country were hampered by 
risk-averse lawyers.8 In the words of that commission’s report, “quite 
often the cited legal impediments ended up being . . . myths that 
overcautious lawyers had never debunked . . . . Needless to say, such 
confusion about what the law actually requires can seriously hinder 
the Intelligence Community’s ability to be proactive and innovative.”9
 In short, the message sent to our national security lawyers in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks was clear; it was bipartisan; and 
it was all but unanimous. This message was that the legal culture in 
our intelligence agencies, and in the Justice Department, was too risk-
averse. It needed to be more aggressive, it needed to push to the lim-
its of the law, to give policymakers and operators the most flexibility 
possible to confront the existential threat of international terrorism. 
 As Professor Jack Goldsmith, a former Assistant Attorney General 
in the Justice Department who now teaches at Harvard Law School, 
put it in what I regard as his indispensable recent book, The Terror 
Presidency: “The consistent refrain from the [9/11] Commission, Con-
gress, and pundits of all stripes was that the government must be 
more forward-leaning against the terrorist threat: more imaginative, 
more aggressive, less risk-averse.”10
 As of now, we have gone seven years without another terrorist 
attack within the United States, and we are now hearing a rather dif-
ferent refrain. Today, many of the senior government lawyers who 
provided legal advice in support of the nation’s most important coun-
terterrorism policies have been subjected to relentless public criti-
cism. In some corners, one even hears suggestions—suggestions that 
are made in a manner that is almost breathtakingly casual—that some 
of these lawyers should be subject to civil or criminal liability for the 
advice they gave. The rhetoric of these discussions is hostile and un-
forgiving. 
 The difficulty and novelty of the legal questions these lawyers 
confronted is scarcely mentioned. Indeed, the vast majority of the 
criticism is unaccompanied by any serious legal analysis. Additionally, 
it is rarely acknowledged that those public servants were often work-
ing in an atmosphere of almost unimaginable pressure, without the 
academic luxury of endless time for debate. Equally ignored is the 
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fact that, based on all the evidence I have seen and heard, those law-
yers reached their conclusions in good faith based upon their best 
judgments of what the law required. 
 Those of you who may be students of national security issues—or 
those who have simply been around long enough—know that we 
have, as the saying goes, “seen this movie before.” For decades, we 
have witnessed what Professor Goldsmith calls “cycles of timidity and 
aggression” among political leaders, and the public, in their attitudes 
towards the intelligence community.11
 As Professor Goldsmith explains, political leaders—and he might 
as well have added opinion leaders outside the government, including 
academics, to that list as well—in his words: 
pressure the community to engage in controversial action at 
the edges of the law, and then fail to protect it from recrimi-
nations when things go awry. This leads the community to 
retrench and become risk averse, which invites complaints by 
politicians that the community is fecklessly timid. Intelli-
gence excesses of the 1960s led to the Church committee 
reproaches and reforms of the 1970s, which led to com-
plaints that the community had become too risk averse, 
which led to the aggressive behavior under William Casey in 
the 1980s that resulted in the Iran-Contra and related scan-
dals, which led to another round of intelligence purges and 
restrictions in the 1990s that deepened the culture of risk 
aversion and once again led (both before and after 9/11) to 
complaints about excessive timidity.12
 That is the political pendulum as Jack Goldsmith describes it. 
The pendulum is swinging back once again; indeed, it is safe to say 
that this latest swing began some time ago. No doubt this cycle, or 
something like it, is healthy in some sense. The sometimes competing 
imperatives to protect the nation and to safeguard our civil liberties 
are undoubtedly worthy of public debate and discussion. Oversight 
and review of our intelligence activities—by Congress, the executive 
branch, and, where possible, by the public—is vitally important. 
 But it is equally important that such scrutiny be conducted re-
sponsibly, with appreciation of its institutional implications. In evalu-
ating the work of national security lawyers, political leaders and the 
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public must not forget what was asked of those lawyers in the days and 
months following the attacks of September 11. We cannot afford to 
invite another “cycle of timidity” in the intelligence community; the 
stakes are simply too high. 
 For the good lawyer who understands that there will be such 
scrutiny of his or her decisions in the future, there is no alternative 
except to do law. Hard though it may be, the good lawyer must be in-
different to the fact that he may well be criticized, whatever he may 
decide. It is the task of the good lawyer to tune out this white noise, to 
give the best reading of what the law is—and not to confuse what the 
law is with what that lawyer, or someone else, thinks the law ought to 
be. 
 If the lawyer’s best reading of the law permits some policy, he has 
a professional obligation to say that it would be lawful—even if he 
personally disagrees with it, or recognizes that it may one day prove 
politically controversial. Just as important—perhaps more important— 
if the lawyer believes that some policy would be unlawful, he has a 
professional and ethical obligation to say no—even if some people 
think that the policy is critical. The rule of law, and the oath every 
public servant takes to support and defend the Constitution, depend 
on it.13
 Although only a few of you are likely to become national security 
lawyers and face these precise dilemmas, the responsibility to do law 
applies to each of you. The lawyer in private practice must not con-
fuse his client’s interest with the law; he has an obligation to say no if 
no is the right answer, even if the client doesn’t want to hear it. The 
lawyer pursuing what he believes to be the public interest must not 
confuse personal views on what the law ought to be for what the law is. 
And the lawyer in robes (as I once was, and as some of you no doubt 
will be), like the image of Justice blindfolded, must decide cases, as 
the judicial oath says, without respect to persons; that is, not based on 
who the parties are or what outcome may be well received in any par-
ticular quarter, but based on his or her best reading of what the law 
requires.14
 In becoming lawyers, you are becoming the custodians of a 
trust—a trust whose assets are the rule of law and the justice that re-
sults from that rule of law. Being a custodian of that trust carries with 
it solemn responsibilities. But it is also a great privilege because you 
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will play a large role in the most essential debates of our times. I urge 
you to play it well; much hangs in the balance. 
